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The Eurovision Song Contest is an annual musical competition held among active members of the Euro-
pean Broadcasting Union since 1956. The event is televised live across Europe. Each participating country
presents a song and receive a vote based on a combination of tele-voting and jury. Over the years, this
has led to speculations of tactical voting, discriminating against some participants and thus inducing bias
in the final results. In this paper we investigate the presence of positive or negative bias (which may
roughly indicate favouritisms or discrimination) in the votes based on geographical proximity, migration
and cultural characteristics of the participating countries through a Bayesian hierarchical model. Our anal-
ysis found no evidence of negative bias, although mild positive bias does seem to emerge systematically,
linking voters to performers.
Keywords: Bayesian hierarchical models; ordinal logistic regression; Eurovision song contest
1. Introduction
The Eurovision Song Contest is an annual musical competition held among active members of
the European Broadcasting Union (EBU). The first edition of the contest was held in 1956 in
Lugano (Switzerland). The event was televised live across Europe, in what represented a highly
technological experiment in broadcasting.
Members of the EBU approved plans to hold the contest on an annual basis and there were
initially seven participating countries: The Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, France,
Luxembourg and Italy, each entering the competition with two songs. The winner was decided
by a jury which consisted of an equal number of members per participating country.
The voting system in the contest has changed over time. From 1962 onwards, positional voting
was used, eventually leading to the current point system, in which 12, 10, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1
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points are allocated to each country’s top 10 favourite songs. The country with the highest score
overall is announced as the winner.
Tele-voting was introduced in 1997 and allowed viewers from participating nations to vote for
their favourite act via phone, email or text. Austria, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK
trialled the system, while the rest continued using juries. In 1998 all countries used tele-voting
to determine the points awarded to the top 10 preferred acts, and from then onwards all countries
have used this system or a mixture of tele-voting/juries to determine the way in which points are
allocated.
Especially with the introduction of tele-voting, accusations of bias in the voting system have
been brought forward by several commentators. Famously, in 2008 Sir Terry Wogan announced
that he would quit as the BBC’s Eurovision contest commentator after casting doubts over
the regularity of the contest [1]. Periodically, the media investigate accusations of wrong-
doing in the management of the contest [2] and the problem of bias and political influence
over the voting system of the Eurovision contest has been also considered in the scientific
literature.
Yair [15] is probably the first paper addressing the issue of collusive voting behaviour in
the contest; his analysis based on multidimensional social networks showed the presence of
three main ‘bloc’ areas: Western, Mediterranean and Northern, although no detailed statistical
assessment was given of the derived associations among countries attitude towards each other.
Clerides and Stengos [3] used an econometric model to quantify the impact of factors determin-
ing affinity and objective quality on the actual votes. Their conclusions were that some evidence
of reciprocity was found, but no strategic voting resulted from the analysis. Fenn et al. [5] used
dynamical network and cluster models to show that while the existence of ‘unofficial cliques’ of
countries is supported by the empirical evidence, the underlying mechanism for this cannot be
fully explained by geographical proximity. Spierdijk and Vellekoop [13] investigated how geo-
graphical, cultural, linguistic, and religious factors lead to voting bias using multilevel models
and considering the bias of one country towards another as the dependent variable. Their analy-
sis points to evidence to suggest that geographical and social factors influence certain countries
voting behaviour, although political factors did not seem to play a role in influencing voting. In
a similar vein, Ginsburgh and Noury [7] argue that determinants other than political conflicts
or friendships, such as linguistic and cultural proximity, seem to be mostly associated with the
observed voting patterns.
All in all, the existing scientific evidence seems to suggest that indeed there are particular
voting patterns that tend to show up more often than not; however, it is less clear whether this
can be taken as definitive proof of the existing of fundamental bias, either in terms of favouritism
or discrimination. In this paper we aim at quantifying the presence of systematic bias in the
propensity to vote for a given performer. We use a Bayesian hierarchical framework to model
the score as a function of a random (structured) effect which depends on cultural and spatial
proximity, as well as on migration stocks. Using this strategy we aim at capturing the possible
effects of social as well as geographical components which might influence the voting patterns.
Moreover, we control for some potential confounder factors, i.e. the year in which the contest
was held, the country hosting the contest, the language in which each song was sung and the type
of act (male solo artist, female solo artist or mixed group).
As we will discuss later, we are not particularly interested in the ‘effect’ of these covariates on
the score associated with a given voter, a given performer and a given occasion. Rather, we use
these to balance the data and account for potentially different baseline characteristics. Nor are
we focussed on predicting the actual votes for next instance of the contest, given them. The main
objective of the paper is to try and identify the impact of the social and geographical structured
effect on the voting patterns and thus, unlike many regression models, the interest of our analysis
lies almost exclusively on the random effects.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the available data and the
variables used in the model; Section 3 specifies the Bayesian framework used for the analysis
including the model fit index used to find the best specification; Section 4 presents the results for
the best-fitting model, and finally Section 5 discusses some issues related to the model.
2. Data
In this analysis we use data on the final round of votes of the contest during the period
1998–2012 inclusive. This period is selected for pragmatic reasons, since tele-voting was only
adopted from 1998 onwards. The data are available from the official Eurovision contest website
(www.eurovision.tv).
All countries that have voted in the final round in the period under study have been considered
in our analysis. For each combination of voter, performer and year, the votes are available as an
ordinal categorical variable, which can assume values {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,12}.
The available predictors are the following: the language in which each song was sung (the
performer’s language, English, or a mixture of two or more languages), the gender and the type
of performance (group, solo male artist and solo female artist). We specify the random effects
as a function of data on two dimensions: first we consider the migration stocks, obtained from
the World Bank’s dataset (www.worldbank.org) as a proxy of the migration intensity from the
voter’s to the performer’s country. This is supposed to account for possible favouritism in voting
patterns due to the presence of large stocks of people originally from the performer’s country, but
currently living in the voter’s country. Second, we consider the neighbouring structure, defined
in terms of the countries sharing boundaries. This is used to account for similar geographical
characteristics.
3. Bayesian modelling
We define the voters as v = 1, . . . , V = 48 and the performers as p = 1, . . . , P = 43 (i.e. our
data contain some countries that vote but do not perform). The outcome of interest is the variable
yvpt representing the points given by voter v to performer p on occasion (year) t = 1, . . . , Tvp .
Thus, yvpt is a categorical variable which can take any of the S = 11 values in the set of scores
S = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12}. Note that the number of occasions for the voter–performer
pair (Tvp) can vary between 0 and 15 in the dataset considered. Moreover, because not all the
countries have participated consistently throughout the several editions of the contest, the dataset
is not balanced and therefore the value Tvp does vary with the pair (v, p). In particular, this means
that there are H = 1937 observed combinations of voter–performer pairs.
We then model
yvpt ∼ Categorical(π vpt),
where π vpt = (πvpt1, . . . , πvptS) represents a vector of model probabilities that voter v scores
performer p exactly s ∈ S points on occasion t.
As mentioned earlier, in addition to the main outcome, we observe some covariates defined at
different levels. Formally, we define:
• The year in which the contest is held as x1t. To simplify the interpretation, we actually include
in the model the derived variable representing the difference between the year under consid-
eration and the first year in the series, x∗1t = x1t − 1998. Including this covariate in the model
is helpful in accounting for external factors, specific to the particular contest, that may have
affected the observed scores;
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• The language in which a song is sung as x2pt. This can take on the values 1 = English, 2 = own
and 3 = mixed (i.e. a combination of two or more languages);
• The type of performance as x3pt. This can take on the values 1 = Group, 2 =
Female solo artist or 3 = Male solo artist.
Since x2pt and x3pt are categorical variables, we define suitable dummies x(c)lpt for l = 2, 3 and
c = 1, . . . Cl, taking value 1 if xlpt = c and 0 otherwise. Thus, C2 = 3 and C3 = 3.
Following standard notation in ordinal regression [4,8,10], we model the cumulative probabil-
ities ηvpts := Pr(yvpt ≤ s) as
logit(ηvpts) = λs − μvpt, (1)
with the obvious implication that πvpt1 = ηvpt1; πvpts = ηvps − ηvpt(s−1) , for s = 2, . . . , S − 1;
and πvptS = 1 − ηvptS . Here, λ = (λ1, . . . , λS) is a set of random cutoff points for the latent
continuous outcome associated with the observed categorical variable. In order to respect the
ordering constraint implicit in the ordinal structure of the data, we model
λ1 ∼ Normal(0, σ 2λ )I(−∞, λ2),
λ2 ∼ Normal(0, σ 2λ )I(λ1, λ3),
. . .
λS−1 ∼ Normal(0, σ 2λ )I(λS−2, λS),
λS ∼ Normal(0, σ 2λ )I(λS−1, ∞).
Assuming a large variance with respect to the scale in which the variables λs are defined (e.g.
σ 2λ = 10) effectively ensures that the strength of the prior is not overwhelming in comparison to
the evidence provided by the data. In addition, the linear predictor μvpt is defined as a function
of the relevant covariates
μvpt = β1x∗1t +
C2∑
c=2
β2cx
(c)
2pt +
C3∑
c=2
β3cx
(c)
3t + αvp. (2)
The vector of unstructured (fixed) coefficients is defined as β = (β1,β2,β3), with β2 =
(β22, β23) and β3 = (β32, β33). The elements in β measure the impact of the covariates on the
probability that, on occasion t, performer p receives a vote in S from voter v. We consider as
reference categories the values English for x(c)2pt and Group for x
(c)
3pt. As is clear from Equation (1),
the model is set up under a proportional odds assumption, i.e. that the effect of the predictors is
constant across the ordered categories. The negative sign in Equation (1) helps with the interpre-
tation of the β coefficients: larger coefficients are associated with higher probability of a higher
score.
We specify independent and minimally informative Normal priors for the unstructured
coefficients
β ∼ Normal(m, Q),
where m is a vector of zeros of length B = (1 +∑3l=2 Cl) = 5 (i.e. the length of the vector β)
and Q = q2IB is a (B × B) diagonal covariance matrix with q = 104.
3.1 Modelling the structured effect αvp
The coefficient αvp is the parameter of main interest in our analysis and it represents a structured
(random) effect, accounting for clustering at the voter–performer level, which is implied by the
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fact that we observe repeated instances of the voting pattern from country v towards country p,
over the years.
We use a formulation
αvp ∼ Normal(θvp, σ 2α ),
where the mean is specified as
θvp = γ + δRvp + ψwvp + φzvpI(zvp). (3)
Here, the coefficient γ represents the overall intercept; the covariate wvp takes value 1 if countries
v and p share a geographic border and 0 otherwise; and the covariate zvp represents an estimate
of the migration intensity from country v to country p. Thus, ψ is the ‘geographic’ effect and φ
is the ‘migration’ effect. Notice that, by design, if there is no recorded migration from v to p we
automatically set this effect to 0.
In addition, we assume that voters implicitly cluster in K ‘regions’; this accounts for similari-
ties in voters’ propensity towards the performers, over and above the geographic and migratory
aspects defined above. For example, because of ‘cultural’ proximity, countries in the Former
Soviet bloc may have the same attitude towards one of the performers p, regardless of whether
they are close geographically or the amount of migration from p. For each voter we define a
latent categorical variable Rv which can take values 1, 2, . . . , K (for a fixed upper bound K),
i.e. Rv ∼ Categorical(ζ ), where ζ = (ζ1, . . . , ζK) is the vector of probabilities that each voter
belongs in each of the clusters. We use a minimally informative Dirichlet prior on ζ . Conse-
quently, the coefficients δkp (for k = 1, . . . , K) represent a set of structured common residual for
each combination of macro-area and performer, which we use to describe the ‘cultural’ effect.
We model the parameters in the linear predictor for θvp using the following specification: γ , ψ
and φ are given independent minimally informative Normal distributions (centred on 0 and with
large variance), while δkp are given an exchangeable structure
δkp ∼ Normal(0, σ 2δ ).
The two structured variances are given independent minimally informative prior on the log
standard deviation scale
log(σα), log(σδ)
iid∼ Uniform(−3, 3).
Since the priors for both σα and σδ are defined on the log scale, a range of (−3, 3) is in fact
reasonably large and thus these distributions do not imply strict prior constraints on the range
of the variability. Sensitivity analyses upon varying the scale of the Uniform distributions have
confirmed that the results are generally insensitive to this aspect of the modelling.
The coefficients αvp have an interesting interpretation: consider two voters v1 and v2 and one
performer p; for each fixed score s, αv1p and αv2p determine the difference in the estimated prob-
ability that either voter would score the performer at most s points, ηvpts , all other covariates
being equal (notice that, in our model, none of them depend on the voter anyway). In fact, it
easily follows from Equation (1) and (2) that, if αv1p > αv2p, for any possible score s the chance
that v1 scores p more than s points is greater than the chance that v2 will.
In this sense, we can use the coefficients αvp to quantify the presence of ‘favoritism’ or ‘dis-
crimination’ between specific countries. Estimated values of αvp substantially below 0 indicate
that voter v tends to systematically underscore performer p, while values substantially above 0
suggest a systematic pattern in which v scores p higher votes than other voters. Of course, we
cannot grant a causal interpretation to this analysis: the acts of favouritism or discrimination
imply some deliberate intervention, which we are not able to capture from our data. Neverthe-
less, we can interpret the estimated values for αvp as at least indicative of the underlying voting
patterns.
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3.2 Estimation procedure
The posterior distributions for the parameters of interest are obtained through an MCMC sim-
ulation, implemented in WinBUGS [9,11], which we have integrated within R using the library
R2WinBUGS [14] − the code to run the model is available on request. Since the model is rel-
atively computationally intensive, we used the R library snowfall, which allows multicore
computation. The results are based on two chains. For each, we considered 11,000 iterations
following 1000 burnin; in addition we thinned the chains selecting one iteration every 20.
Convergence to the relevant posterior distributions has been checked visually through trace-
plots and density plots, as well as analytically through the Gelman Rubin diagnostic [6] and the
analysis of autocorrelation and the effective sample size.
4. Results
We tested three different versions of our model, upon varying the number of possible ‘regions’
in which the voters can cluster. We tried values of K = 3, 4, 5 and compared the resulting models
using the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) [12]. The preferred model is the one with four
regions (DIC = 36,832, while the models with three and five components have DIC = 36,868 and
DIC = 36,844, respectively).
Figure 1 shows the posterior probability that each voter belongs in one of the 4 clusters. We
have labelled them as ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ and ‘4’ (they appear in Figure 1 in increasing shades of grey,
i.e. region ‘1’ is the lightest and region ‘4’ the darkest).
Countries in the former Yugoslavia (notice that because of political changes occurred during
the period considered, Serbia and Montenegro are present both as a single country and separately)
are clearly clustered in region ‘1’, where also Switzerland and Austria tend to feature. This can be
explained by their close geographical proximity with the Balkans as well as possible migrations
after the 1990s war. Region ‘2’ is mainly composed by voters in central and southern Europe,
but curiously countries such as Bulgaria and Romania tend to cluster in this group, too. This is
possibly due to illegal migrations, especially from Romania towards countries such as Spain or
Italy. In addition, countries such as Turkey and Albania show a large propensity of clustering in
this region. Regions ‘3’ and ‘4’ show a lower degree of separation and tend to include countries
in the Former Soviet bloc (mainly in region ‘4’) and countries in northern Europe (specifically
Scandinavian countries as well as the UK and Ireland). This result is overall in line with the
findings of Yair [15].
Table 1 shows the posterior mean and 95% credibility interval for the unstructured effects
from the regression model. We re-iterate that these are not the main interest of the analysis
and are included in the model primarily to adjust for potential unbalance in the background
characteristics of every voting occasion. Nevertheless, it is possible to see that the analysis of
β2 suggests that performers singing in their own language are generally scored lower than those
singing in English. Also from the results for the coefficients in β3 it appears that female solo
artists tend to get higher scores than group performances. Both the unstructured geographic effect
and migration effect seem to be positively associated with higher scores. Performing countries
tend to be scored highly by their neighbours and by countries where their population tend to
migrate.
More interestingly, for each pair (v, p), we can analyse the structured effects αvp , describing
the systematic components in the voting patterns. In order to make the results comparable on
the same scale, we standardised them, i.e. we centred them around the observed grand mean and
divided by the observed overall standard deviation, e.g.
α∗vp =
αvp − α¯
sα
,
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Figure 1. Posterior probability that each voter belongs in one of the four regions. The lightest shade of grey
indicates the cluster (region) labelled as ‘1’, while increasingly darker shades of grey indicate regions ‘2’,
‘3’ and ‘4’, respectively. Countries are labelled using their ISO country code, as follows: BIH, Bosnia and
Herzegovina; HRV, Croatia; MKD, Macedonia; MNE, Montenegro; SVN, Slovenia; CHE, Switzerland;
SCG, Serbia and Montenegro; AUT, Austria; SRB, Serbia; ALB, Albania; SVK, Slovakia; TUR, Turkey;
MCO, Monaco; ITA, Italy; BEL, Belgium; FRA, France; DEU, Germany; NLD, Netherlands; ROU, Roma-
nia; AZE, Azerbaijan; ESP, Spain; SMR, San Marino; BGR, Bulgaria; GEO, Georgia; CYP, Cyprus; MDA,
Moldova; ISR, Israel; PRT, Portugal; SWE, Sweden; NOR, Norway; DNK, Denmark; AND, Andorra; FIN,
Finland; RUS, Russia; CZE, Czech Republic; GRC, Greece; MLT, Malta; ARM, Armenia; EST, Esto-
nia; HUN, Hungary; ISL, Iceland; IRE, Ireland; LVA, Latvia; LTU, Lithuania; POL, Poland; GBR, United
Kingdom; UKR, Ukraine; BLR, Belarus.
Table 1. Summary of the posterior distributions for the unstructured effects of
the regression model.
Coefficient (variable) Mean 95% Credible interval
β1 (Year) −0.034 −0.044 −0.023
β22 (Mixed language)a −0.062 −0.066 0.194
β32 (Own language)a −0.131 −0.255 −0.010
β32 (Solo female artist)b 0.232 0.131 0.328
β33 (Solo male artist)b −0.067 −0.170 0.034
ψ (Geographic effect) 1.210 0.996 1.430
φ (Migration effect) 0.101 0.076 0.126
Notes: a Reference: English.
b Reference: Group artist.
with
α¯ =
V∑
v=1
P∑
p=1
αvp
H
and s2α =
V∑
v=1
P∑
p=1
(αvp − α¯)2
H − 1 .
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Standardisation of the coefficients makes it easier to select some arbitrary thresholds above or
below which the effect can be considered to be ‘substantial’, therefore indicating the presence of
bias. Since, as confirmed by the analysis of the posterior distributions (not shown), the αvp are
reasonably normally distributed, we consider a threshold of ±1.96. Thus, values of α∗vp > 1.96
suggest positive bias (‘favouritism’) from v to p, while values of α∗vp < −1.96 are indicative of
negative bias (‘discrimination’) from v against p.
The analysis of the entire distributions for the α∗vp confirms the absence of clear negative bias
throughout the set of voters and performers. In other words, no evidence is found to support the
hypothesis that one of the voters systematically ‘discriminates’ against one of the performers.
On the other hand, some patterns of positive bias do emerge from the analysis. This is evident
from Figure 2: for each of the H voter–performer combinations, the solid circles represent the
posterior probability of a positive bias: Pr(α∗vp > 1.96|y) , while the open circles are the posterior
probability of a negative bias: Pr(α∗vp < −1.96|y) . As is possible to see, the latter never exceeds
0.75.
Figure 3 shows a representation of the posterior distributions of the α∗vp for four selected per-
formers. The wide variability in the range of the distributions is driven by the fact that the data
are unbalanced, i.e. not all the countries compete in every year under investigation. Therefore,
the estimation of the coefficient for some of the combinations of voter–performer may be based
on only a few instances, thus inducing wide variability – e.g. Italy in Figure 3(c).
The voting patterns towards Sweden show a clear absence of any systematic negative bias,
since no distribution is entirely below zero, let alone the threshold of −1.96. Many of the
countries that are closely related to Sweden either geographically or culturally (most notably,
Denmark, Norway and Finland) are associated with higher propensity to score the Swedish act
higher points. The distribution for Denmark is nearly all above the threshold of 1.96, indicating
a potential positive bias.
Voter−performer combination
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Figure 2. Posterior probability that the standardised structured effects exceed the thresholds ±1.96: the
open circles ◦ in the bottom part of the graph indicate Pr(α∗vp < −1.96|y), which represents discrimination
from v to p, while the solid circles • in the top part of the graph indicate Pr(α∗vp > 1.96|y), which describes
positive bias from v to p.
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Figure 3. The dots represent the posterior means of the structured effects α∗vp, indicating for each voter
v the propensity to vote for performer p: (a) Sweden (top-left corner), (b) Greece (top-right), (c) Albania
(bottom-left) and (d) Turkey (bottom-right). Dark and light lines indicate the 50% and 95% credibility
intervals, respectively.
The analysis for other performers show also interesting behaviours: for example, Greece seems
to be substantially favoured by its close neighbours Cyprus (for which similarity is geographic
as well as cultural) and Albania. Moreover, there is a very large set of voters for which the
entire distribution of α∗vp is completely above 0, while no distribution is completely below 0.
This indicates a general positive attitude towards Greece, which may be fostered by widespread
migrations across Europe.
At the other end of the spectrum, the voting patterns towards Albania are characterised by a
large number of voters showing a distribution entirely below 0. While none exceeds the ‘dis-
crimination threshold’ of −1.96, this seems to suggest very low popularity among the voters.
Neighbouring countries such as Macedonia and Montenegro have higher propensities to vote for
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Albania, but these are not substantial (i.e. they are never greater than the ‘favouritism threshold’
of 1.96).
Finally, Turkey seems to be substantially favoured in Germany – possibly due to the large
number of Turkish migrants living in (and potentially tele-voting from) Germany. A few other
distributions are entirely above 0; for many of those the same migration arguments can be brought
forward, while for Azerbaijan there probably are cultural similarities that increase the propensity
to vote for Turkey.
5. Discussion
In this paper we have tried to seek empirical evidence of systematic bias in the Eurovision contest
voting. In particular, we have tried to disentangle the two possible extreme behaviours of neg-
ative (which may be indicative of ‘discrimination’) and positive bias (which possibly suggests
‘favouritism’), defined in terms of tail probabilities.
We have used a hierarchical structure to account for correlation induced in repeated instances
of the same voter–performer pattern, which occur over time. This by necessity causes shrink-
age in the estimations; on the one hand, this potentially limits the ability to identify extreme
behaviours. However, on the other hand, because in some cases the sample size observed for
a given combination of voter–performer is very small, the hierarchical structure is necessary to
avoid unstable estimates for the propensity to vote. In addition, shrinkage is likely to occur
on both ends of the distributions; in our results, we are able to identify some examples of
‘favouritism’, but no real ‘discrimination’ occurs (according to our criteria). Thus, it is reasonable
to assume that shrinkage does not impact dramatically on our ability to detect bias.
After having considered some potentially unbalancing factors, we have structured the propen-
sity to vote for a given performer as a function of several components, designed to capture
geographic, population movements and cultural effects. The latter has been obtained through a
clustering model of the voters embedded in the Bayesian formulation and based on the assump-
tion that voters in the same cultural cluster tend to share similar attitudes towards a given
performer. The resulting allocation of voters to the clusters is often consistent with prior expecta-
tion about geographical and historical circumstances (e.g. the countries in the Former Yugoslavia
tend to clearly cluster together). However, because the procedure is mainly data-driven, we gain
in flexibility, for example with respect to conditionally autoregressive structures, in modelling
spatial correlation.
A related point consists the number of ‘regions’ that we have used in the clustering procedure.
For simplicity, we have assumed that this was fixed, although we have tested several alternatives
to capture the heterogeneity within European nations (for example, to acknowledge the presence
of at least four distinct macro-areas: the Former Soviet bloc, Former Yugoslavia, Scandinavia
and the rest of Europe).
In conclusion, the findings from our model seem to suggest that no real negative bias emerges
in the tele-voting – in fact, no substantial negative bias occurs across all the combinations of
voters–performers. In some cases (and in accordance with previous findings in the literature), we
found moderate to substantial positive bias, which could be explained by strong ‘cultural’ simi-
larities, e.g. due to commonalities in language and history, and to a lesser extent to geographical
proximity and migrations. Our formulation highlights the power of Bayesian hierarchical models
in dealing with complex data, allowing to properly account for the underlying correlation among
the observed data and, possibly, at the higher levels of the assumed structure.
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